Ian is joined this week by Jeremy Saunders, and the duo start the episode by looking at the shape of the Canada and U.S. yield curves relative to what is priced for monetary policy in each region. Ian discusses why he views the recent bond market rally to be technical, while Jeremy provides his take on why it has been more fundamentally based. Over the balance of the episode the team discuss the outlook for swap spreads, the inflection point for a Fed pivot, and why CDOR cessation should a much less uncertain transition compared to the U.S. experience with LIBOR.
Jeremy Saunders: Your customers show up at your door and say, I want widgets. And so they go okay, supplier. Mind the widgets and they go, okay, we’ll see you in six months. And meanwhile, six months later they get a pallet of widgets and the customers are saying, I want a vacation.
Ian Pollick: Here’s the widgets.
Jeremy Saunders: Yeah, exactly. Well, I only got widgets.
Ian Pollick: So I’m joined today by Jeremy Saunders. Jeremy, how’s it going, man?
Jeremy Saunders: Hey Ian, I’m doing good.
Ian Pollick: Are you doing good, though?
Jeremy Saunders: Oh, I’ve been hiding under my desk a little bit, but other than that.
Ian Pollick: Okay, so pop quiz hotshot Canada US Forward Curves. Canada one year, one year two year, one year is minus seven. U.S. one year, one year two one year is -35. Canada two year one year three year one year is -14. U.S. two year one year three one year is minus two and yet Ford OAS has the bank going 40 more than the Fed. How does that make sense?
Jeremy Saunders: Yeah. I mean, I think you asked me ahead of this, what, you know, in forward space I think looks compelling. And my real answer is liquidity is really tough in this stuff. And if I had to pick one, I had written down two, one, three, one in Canada. That doesn’t make a lot of sense.
Ian Pollick: It doesn’t make a lot of sense. Right. Because I don’t think it is a fundamental story because it doesn’t jive. But I think that you’re right, liquidity is not good right now.
Jeremy Saunders: People are doing stuff because they have to do stuff right now. In the front end spreads, I think for someone who can can stomach it, it’s an interesting trade to look at, but liquidity is really tough right now, I think.
Ian Pollick: So let’s take a step back and let’s give a little structure to the conversation before we just air our grievances for half an hour. You know, we record our podcast the day before we release it. So by the time this comes out, maybe the market will have sold off and given back everything. It’s kind of doubtful. But let’s talk about the recent rally. You know, it’s Thursday for us. You’re hearing this on a Friday. I guess my question for you is, what do you think is behind this rally? Is this the recession rally in the sense that this is fundamentals driving it, weak PMIs kicked it off. Fed speak doesn’t seem to be abating it or is this technical because I’m not a technical guy but you have filled a lot of these gaps and gaps always get filled. And, you know, when I look at the curve, tens bonds is steepened eight basis points yesterday. When I look at where the next resistance lines are, it’s kind of, let’s say 3%, 30 years, 3%, ten years to 2% 95 years talking CAD here. So that’s a pretty big curve move. But what’s behind this?
Jeremy Saunders: Yeah, I mean, you know, markets are reflexive, right? The last kind of call it fundamental market participant finally got convinced by the Fed hiking 75 that they were going to go for broke. And then as soon as sort of that last guy gets in, people start thinking about, okay, so what happens when they hiked to three and one half percent at the end of this year? Well, something’s probably going to break. What happens when something breaks. Well, they’re probably going to have to stop? That means I should buy bonds. As silly as that sounds, markets are both reflexive and forward looking, and every rally starts with short covering, right?
Ian Pollick: Yeah. So this was a it was definitely you can feel the position squeeze, right?
Jeremy Saunders: For sure.
Ian Pollick: Yesterday was the first day where it felt very grabby, very mine-yours. It felt very orderly until that point. But it’s interesting because I think one of the things that we have learned really from the Fed, you know, two weeks ago was that they are choosing inflation over growth like growth be damned conditions are tightening.
Jeremy Saunders: But remember, I mean, Jay Powell said it himself. Their policy works through influencing financial conditions. Financial conditions are ten year bonds, ten year bonds priced-in, tightening to 3.75 already. This is the reflexive nature of it. Those hikes are in the economy. Right? I think maybe the last time I was on your podcast, I said this as well is I don’t really believe as much in the long and variable lags for monetary policy. And in part that is because of forward guidance and communication that central banks have innovated on since the last time.
Ian Pollick: It’s been very transparent, right? And I think, you know, we got a very transparent statement from Powell in his testimony this week and he said, look, I’m going to calibrate where I think year-end Fed funds should be given a Taylor rule type of framework. So I kind of went back and I looked at the Cleveland Fed’s website and they have seven different policy rules, and the Taylor rule is just one of them. But I looked at them all and then I average them out and you kind of get that. 325-340 is kind of the zone you’re supposed to be in by the end of the year. And so when you’re one year as at 315, yeah, there’s a little bit of room left, but you’re kind of there. Right? But then also it’s what you said earlier, it’s like financial conditions usually are the output in a tightening cycle. This time they were the input because of the type of inflation that we’re getting.
Jeremy Saunders: Exactly.
Ian Pollick: And asset prices started at much more extreme levels. So, are we really this surprised? And if bonds are right, let’s say bonds are right right now, you know, in our own forecast,
Jeremy Saunders: Right now or right half an hour ago?
Ian Pollick: Right yesterday, because I don’t know what today’s going to bring, but, you know, we had this idea of peak yields around that three 33-40 level in ten years in both Canada and the US. So, you know, I’m comforted to see the market kind of moving there, but it’s moved really quickly. And so I never trust very, very rapid moves in terms of their staying power. But I guess the question is this a go with or is it a fade, let’s say, over the next week?
Jeremy Saunders: So I think there’s two questions. I think there’s the level of duration. And there’s the curve. Right?
Ian Pollick: So let’s talk about duration first.
Jeremy Saunders: Yeah, I think, again, I think the reflexivity here is significant. We had a huge sell off. If you zoom out and you look on a chart like this rally is you can’t even see it yet, right? I’m not an expert here, but I think a lot of systematic fixed income accounts are close to max short as well they should be on the models and that’s money that if it comes out is not going to be thinking about, well, what’s the Fed going to do? It’s going to be thinking about shift F nine. Yeah I buy.
Ian Pollick: Yeah. But do you think this is enough to like the momentum has been quite aggressive.
Jeremy Saunders: I don’t have a huge amount of fundamental conviction either way. Like 325, 315, three, 3% ten. And so I think if you’re on a very short horizon, it’s probably a go with, but I mean, I think the biggest problem in markets right now is there are two equally plausible, diametrically opposed 12 month forward outlooks. Basically every ask.
Ian Pollick: Either you keep going and rates have to go higher or you’ve gone too far and then something is broken.
Jeremy Saunders: The backward data, the backward looking hard data is awesome. The forward looking survey data is terrible.
Ian Pollick: Terrible.
Jeremy Saunders: The Fed has told you they will hike to 375 no matter what. Everyone thinks in their heart of hearts something will break before then. Which one of those is wrong?
Ian Pollick: Well, I don’t think you’ve ever seen a situation where you have reprice leverage and remove liquidity and something good has come out of.
Jeremy Saunders: In a massively financialized economy and like every other cycle has ended when they broke something and they broke something going 25s so I’m sympathetic to the view that three 75s in a row, something’s going to float to the surface.
Ian Pollick: Well, it moves much quicker and particularly in a market like Canada. You are already starting to see some of the housing data turn over. I’m a bit sceptical, to be honest with you, on some of this inventory data and the narrative around it. Like when I speak to a variety of accounts and some of them in the corporate sector, what is apparent to me is that inventories are building not because demand is necessarily rolling over, but transportation and logistics are still a very big issue.
Jeremy Saunders: But also people are shifting their consumption patterns very rapidly, right? What people were bid without for six months ago is not what they’re bid with out for now. Yeah. So it’s not what they were bid without for 12 months ago.
Ian Pollick: So it goes from just in time to just in case. And so inventories are higher in certain sectors like retail. That’s real.
Jeremy Saunders: But it’s even worse than that, right?
Ian Pollick: But businesses I don’t necessarily think that’s the right narrative.
Jeremy Saunders: It’s even worse than that because it’s like an ongoing bullwhip, right? Your customers show up at your door and say, I want widgets. And so they go okay, supplier mind the widgets and they go, okay, we’ll see you in six months. And meanwhile, six months later they get a pallet of widgets and the customer is saying, I want a vacation.
Ian Pollick: Here’s the widgets.
Jeremy Saunders: Yeah, exactly. Well, I only got widgets. So like, yeah, widgets are going down, but like the stuff that people want is still bid without.
Ian Pollick: So let me ask you this. I was looking at the San Francisco Fed’s website just before this podcast, and they updated their contribution to core PCE and they break it down to three components. One is just ambiguous, they don’t know what it is. One is supply, the other is demand. And what we’ve been seeing for really the past year was that the inflation and core PCE coming from supply was very, very big. It was like 80% of the contribution. But now demand is actually closer to supply. So like you almost have this nice symmetrical 45, kind of 50, distribution. And to me, if I’m the Fed, I take a lot of comfort in that because I can control that 45%. That is what my lever to hit aggregate demand is going to do. So does that validate market pricing right now or is that because I think that means they don’t have to go as far?
Jeremy Saunders: I mean, the real problem with all this is the idea of the granularity of their control and the idea of the linearity of the reactions to what they can do. And so I think I don’t buy the idea of an extra 25 does x. I think the Fed and central banks basically have a dial with three settings.
Ian Pollick: Dial it up to 11.
Jeremy Saunders: Yeah. Well but it has 11, zero and -11, right? They have money printer go brrr, do nothing, and bazooka the economy and they went from money printer go brrr to do nothing and it didn’t work. Well, there hasn’t been a lot of time, but they’ve been forced by politics and optics and so on and so forth to at least say, well, we’re turning it to bazooka. And so the non linearity of price to, imagine this right if you’ve got a store that has whatever it is 100 cars and there’s a thousand people bid for cars, then that price is going up. And if you take one of those people out, it doesn’t do anything to price. And if you take 100 those people out, it doesn’t do anything to price. But at some point you go from there’s 101 people bid for cars and there’s 100 cars, there’s 99 people bid for cars. And all of a sudden there’s going to be a discontinuous jump here.
Ian Pollick: When was the last time you bought something on sale? Seriously. I am trying to think the last time I was like, oh, here’s a sale, mind the sale. I don’t actually remember. Maybe it was like I bought ski boots off season last year, but I haven’t seen sales yet and I think that’s a big part of the narrative. Like that is a tell.
Jeremy Saunders: Yeah, I don’t know if me and you are necessarily buying the representative basket, so I’m not sure I want to read into my consumption habits too much to the broad economy. But I mean, again and the other thing is like that’s true. But like inflation is first derivative, right? If the stuff you’re buying stops going up, inflation goes to zero.
Ian Pollick: So let’s talk about curve for a second. Our view for a while has been, while it may be hard to calibrate what the resting spot is, let’s call it 3%, three and a quarter, whatever. We don’t think it’s that 4% number. It’s very hard to price in cuts, right? So you can moderate where you think the Fed gets through or the bank gets to, but in the absence of credibly being able to price in a cut, because remember, why does the central bank cut? They cut to influence inflation when your output gap is very large. So, you know, the resting spot and what all this maths tells us is that inflation is going to rest north of what a AIT would tell you, what the bank’s target would tell you. So we think a steeper curve is really hard to engender for a very long period of time and so I like this idea that you get this bull flattening move as you kind of progress through the year because these longer dated forwards like five or five or ten year tenure, this stuff is very high yield products and there’s a lot of premium that you need to take away from this. So do you believe that, let’s say the next 25 basis points in curve? Is it steeper or is it flatter?
Jeremy Saunders: Yeah. I mean, I thought, you know, like let’s just talk about us five 30s because it’s easy to look at. I mean, when we were two days ago, a million years ago, we were down ten and I thought it was really tough. I thought the fundamentals, say flatter. That whole story makes sense. But if there is any kind of bad macro data, the knee jerk reaction.
Ian Pollick: The knee jerk and that the point.
Jeremy Saunders: That’s going to be steeper. Yeah, it’s just it’s the robots. It’s the knee jerk. It’s the.
Ian Pollick: It’s the Pavlovian response.
Jeremy Saunders: Models. It’s what has worked, right? And so I thought it was hard to be in a flattener at down ten, but we’re two days and one paradigm away from that now and I don’t think when the smoke clears the steepener is going to make sense here. We’re like when we walk down here, it was like plus ten in five 30s. And it doesn’t make sense to me because the inflation we’re seeing is cyclical. The structural downward effects are still there. And if we’re saying they’re going to have to cut right after they get to 375, which is a story I buy because they are going to break something, then that shouldn’t be a steeper curve. That just means yields can never go above that basically.
Ian Pollick: That threshold, right?
Jeremy Saunders: Right. Like that’s the limit. And so why would you have an upward sloping curve? And the other thing I would say is that if we somehow get a risk resolution on all this, anyone who has a regulatory like asset liability mandate with a return bogey.
Ian Pollick: You have to immunise that.
Jeremy Saunders: Triple B, but also triple B, all-in credit is yielding like five and half to 4%.
Ian Pollick: Provincials are yielding four and a half.
Jeremy Saunders: So people are going to buy that and it’s not fives.
Ian Pollick: No, no, it’s the back-end.
Jeremy Saunders: Yeah, it’s the back end. And so as soon as there’s right now, I imagine there’s hesitancy to buy credit and people there’s huge new issue concessions and why would you step in front of that?
Ian Pollick: The brakes aren’t braking.
Jeremy Saunders: Yeah, but as soon as that all stabilizes like what’s going to get bought by the people with mandates is the long end.
Ian Pollick: So I agree with that. And so for us in our forecast where we have the deepest inversion, it’s not this year, it’s kind of early 21, it’s early 2022. And I think you can stay there for a while because I really don’t believe that the reaction function is as symmetric when you start to get slowing growth and risk off that, you’re going to get more stimulus. That to me is crazy that even when you’re decelerating from nine, but let’s say you’re at 4% inflation, three and a half, you’re not cutting in that environment. I find it very hard to believe that.
Jeremy Saunders: The other thing is the first thing they probably do is is stop QT.
Ian Pollick: Yeah. I mean, that’s a very easy pivot for them to do, right?
Jeremy Saunders: But it also doesn’t make sense to be cutting and still draining liquidity for the curve like it’s kind of counter intuitive, right?
Ian Pollick: So you believe steeper levels, you’re supposed to harvest those, put them into flatteners like tens bonds was -25 like a week ago in Canada, That was a hard thing to own.
Jeremy Saunders: It’s probably the right level.
Ian Pollick: It is the right level, especially with issuance.
Jeremy Saunders: But I just don’t think there’s a lot of upsides of -25 that carry, but once you get this wash out and I don’t know if it’s today, I mean, by the time we get upstairs.
Ian Pollick: You mean yesterday?
Jeremy Saunders: Yeah, exactly. And the other thing is, I mean, again, not an expert, but from what I’ve seen, naive pension rebalance strategy should have to sell bonds and buy equities this month. And that was probably some of the
Ian Pollick: That never works.
Jeremy Saunders: Yeah. Well, the quarter end works.
Ian Pollick: Yeah, but the month stuff doesn’t work well.
Jeremy Saunders: This is a quarter end. I mean, anyways, you know there’s technical stuff in the market right now. But I do think the opportunity duration, it’s really hard to judge. Curve? I think we probably resolve flatter. I don’t see how like there’s one too many fast forward steps. They’re going to hike too much, it’s going to break something so they’re going to have to cut so steepen the curve.
Ian Pollick: However, we’re not there yet.
Jeremy Saunders: They haven’t done it yet.
Ian Pollick: So we should probably flatten. And so like there is this tension, right? And the front end relative to the back end, those two parts of the curve have been diametrically opposed for the past year. And there’s a lot of tension that tension has to break out and that break to me is a flatter curve. So let’s move on spreads. Two-year spreads, let’s start with that. I mean, boxes aren’t tradable. Two-year spreads to me look high relative to basis. But you know who’s a seller of spreads here?
Jeremy Saunders: Well, it’s going to be CTAs. All the silly Canada stuff that has people scratching their head gets fixed by a big systematic-driven rally that it fixes everything. It fixes the tens because they’ve been pounding CGBs, which.
Ian Pollick: Tens are cheap, five tens are steep, which is hurting five year, five years.
Jeremy Saunders: That’s because systematic strategies are going to the liquidity point which is CGB’s and selling it, whereas in the US they can actually trade five year features and three year features and seven year features. In Canada they go, I want to do 1,000,001 of this well, okay, CGB’s and that’s what’s broken $0.05 thirties I think. And that will fix if the systematics all have to try and get.
Ian Pollick: Back to the earlier point I don’t know what that threshold looks like. We played around with these signals, but, you know, it’s very hard. It’s very bespoke. I don’t know if this rapid momentum is enough to do it. I think you need more sustained.
Jeremy Saunders: Yes, for sure. It’s, you need.
Ian Pollick: It’s a look back, right?
Jeremy Saunders: Yeah, you need time and also volatility makes them, well, but volatility makes these things tend to be volatility scale. And so they probably reduce positions and the positions are short. So all of this is constructive for fixing the quote unquote wrong things in Canadian curve and that is two year spreads to high because it’s been systematic paying twos.
Ian Pollick: And five-year spreads too low.
Jeremy Saunders: And selling backs.
Ian Pollick: five tens too steep. five or five year,
Jeremy Saunders: Five year spreads too low, I’m less convinced on.
Ian Pollick: Why?
Jeremy Saunders: Because I think banks are still going to have to do loss to issuance and I don’t think people are going to be fixing mortgages.
Ian Pollick: But in an environment where you see this slowdown, in an environment where because to me, the way I look at it is that all the move in fives has been a liability-led move from the banking system. And that liability move is a function of deposit dynamics relative to loans, which is kind of underwritten by higher rates.
Jeremy Saunders: Yeah, but remember, we’re getting pretty far ahead of the slowdown. We’re repricing a slowdown based on forward looking survey data. That doesn’t necessarily mean what’s coming through the door at the branch has slowed yet.
Ian Pollick: No. So like issuance will continue, right?
Jeremy Saunders: And I guess what time frame are we talking here?
Ian Pollick: Call six months.
Jeremy Saunders: Well, that’s a long time to judge spread. I have no.
Ian Pollick: Call it the next month.
Jeremy Saunders: The next month. I don’t think that fives is the thing to be long necessarily. I mean, spreads are high in Canada in general. I think that tens, you know tens is a weird one because on the one hand, tens can go down if five year, five year gets received. But on the other hand, I suspect that the people who want to receive five year, five year probably have already done it. And the next thing might be them being relieved that they’re able to take it off. And so and the other thing that’s going to happen is if CGB’s go bid that is going to optically widen invoice spreads.
Ian Pollick: Yeah. And so but also you now have the triple role because we just roll to the June 32s. So you know, the last time this happened, you had this divergence between invoice spreads and tenure spreads because as CGBs get whacked, it’s the CCD that captures everything. And as you actually have like this flattening ten-year roll that keeps a lid on invoice, even though you could have higher ten-years.
Jeremy Saunders: Invoice is the lowest thing on the curve, right? Invoice has gone straight down. It’s exactly because of that. It’s because that role has gotten so inverted, because everyone smashing the CGB’s. And so, I mean, I think, it fixes the two’s; that’s probably the most obvious one to me is if you are going to get CTAs pile out, then it fixes the twos and the twos go down. Fives, no strong opinion.
Ian Pollick: You kind of have an opinion.
Jeremy Saunders: Well, I don’t think they’re an obvious buy, put it that way.
Ian Pollick: They are low.
Jeremy Saunders: They’re low, but I think they can stay low.
Ian Pollick: And then longs. We know there’s been some, you know, dynamics related to a telecom merger that’s been shifting the back end, but more so in basis than in spreads.
Jeremy Saunders: But longs are tricky because they’ve gone down, it’s very technical, obviously, out there. I do think that, again, once credit stabilizes, there are people who are going to have stuff to do and that’s sell longs. On the other hand, I also think that some people have gotten ahead of what they think may or may not happen to the telecom deal. And our guys, for what it’s worth, are constructive on that deal going and if there’s fast money in the trade.
Ian Pollick: That’s a lift for spreads
Jeremy Saunders: If people are looking for it to break up then it might go up. And I think if they go up, if they go up on the on that.
Ian Pollick: It pulls stuff with it.
Jeremy Saunders: But then you can sell it because they’re always going to be real.
Ian Pollick: There’s a receiving and there’s needs and issuance is falling in the back end.
Jeremy Saunders: But the low relative to tens, it doesn’t make me love selling them at this level.
Ian Pollick: It’s also weird, right? Like when I look at like getting back to fives like your two size spread switch basically, your two five spread in swap is zero and cash is plus 11. It’s, completely offsetting it. That’s a big number to me.
Jeremy Saunders: People are doing stuff they got to do right now.
Ian Pollick: People doing crazy things. Let’s talk about the forward curve because when I looked at it, let’s say move since the Fed and I look at the one year forwards versus the two year forwards, all the outperformance in the shorter dated one-year forward, like let’s say out to the five-year point is the opposite of what we saw in the longer dated part of the two-year forward curve. So like, why is that? Why do you have like two year like five year two year, six year two year, seven year two year rallied way more than the one-year forwards. Is that technical or is that just noise?
Jeremy Saunders: We’re talking Canada?
Ian Pollick: Yeah, Canada.
Jeremy Saunders: I think you may be ascribing a lot more logic to what’s going on than simply people got to receive what they were paid.
Ian Pollick: Well, then talk to me about the US because you could see it in the five-year forward curve in the US. I mean, what were you looking at?
Jeremy Saunders: Yeah, I think these things are tough. I mean, I think again, my my view is that the belly-led rallies probably turns into a flattener at some point. It just reflects it. It’s just like everyone’s been pounding fives and if you think that what you thought before is wrong, then you go the other way.
Ian Pollick: Okay, let’s talk about cessation for a minute. Threes-ones looks a little bit weird, right? It’s very low in the front, kind of a little bit high in the belly. I know you have very strong opinions on threes-one’s, almost as much as you do on credit markets. But inform us and let us know.
Jeremy Saunders: Big Threes-ones guy.
Ian Pollick: Let us know what you think. What do you think right now?
Jeremy Saunders: You know, honestly, they look orderly to me, to be honest. If you want to get really nitty gritty and like, look at two-year, one-year, it’s like, okay, but is that really tradable? Unlike in the U.S. where, if it was a beep off and you could trade the components a 10th wide and actually have that basis.
Ian Pollick: You can monetize it.
Jeremy Saunders: Yeah, I don’t think you can do that in Canada. There’s not enough liquidity in that market and the same thing for OTAs like they look pretty okay, they’re all within like one half or three quarters. That is less basically than the bid offer spread in what you’d have to pay to get this kind of stuff on.
Ian Pollick: And then, by the way, have you seen that meme from Game of Thrones where the guy says, hold door, hold door, be saying, oh, door oh door. I don’t know who made it, but it’s incredible.
Jeremy Saunders: I can imagine. The joke makes sense to me. Probably, we are amongst like ten people that its funny too. Honestly I think like the advantage of Canada going after everyone else when is the playbook is kind of established, and also the thing that really screwed up the U.S. was the Fed funds to sell for discount switch and LCH and we don’t have that. It’s not going to happen in Canada, there’s not two discounting curve’s, like we’re not switching to that. And so it’s unlikely to create a huge distortion in any of that that can be monetised.
Ian Pollick: All these forward stuff looked to be basically on top of fallback within a normal bid offer channel.
Jeremy Saunders: Yeah, we got pretty in line pretty quickly. I’m actually impressed. This is the one part of the Canadian derivatives market that seems to be orderly, which is odd, but I don’t think that there’s a ton to do there. I mean, the only thing to think of is if someone out there is going to have to get off of basis for some kind of regulatory reason. I just I don’t see who it is. It’s not like the U.S. – in the U.S. People got given hedges by LCH that they couldn’t have, right? They got given mark to market hedges from their clear positions and the regulator said, you can’t put this in accrual, this is mark to market. And so they turned around and said, well, we don’t want it. What do you bid? And the size was known. The timing of when they got it was known. The street made the space to take the risk.
Ian Pollick: Yeah.
Jeremy Saunders: But there’s nothing like that that’s going to come out of this.
Ian Pollick: And why very quickly.
Jeremy Saunders: Because what happened there was, LCH was Fed funds CSA and they said in advance of the market going to SOFR as the primary curve, we’re going to switch all the CSAs from Fed funds to SOFR.
Ian Pollick: And why so do they switch all everything to core? Are we always core?
Jeremy Saunders: We were always core. There’s no two rates. It’s not from unsecured to secure. It’s just they decided they were using the wrong secured rate. And so they said, okay, we’re switching you to from Fed Funds to SOFR. We assume you have Fed fund hedges for your discount risk, which will now be messed up. So we will give you fed funds SOFR basis to fix it. But if you didn’t have those hedges in the first place because you were say like an accrual book that didn’t think about hedging your discount rates, you had an asset matched to a liability, they both have discount rates, it’s the same. Then all of a sudden you’re left with a mark to market derivative that you don’t want.
Ian Pollick: That’s true. We’ve talked for 27 minutes. You’re on your two weeker as of tomorrow. So I hope you have a good time. I hope you come back safe before I let you go. Make me a market on Jays this year. Can you do that?
Jeremy Saunders: God, I cannot even come close.
Ian Pollick: Okay will go Jays go. Listen, I hope you have a great weekend. Remember, there are no bonds harmed in the making of this podcast.
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